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FOCUS ON ETHICS OF REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION
ETHICS IN ADR REPRESENTATION:
A ROAD MAP OF CRITICAL ISSUES
By Carrie Menkel-Meadow
M uch ink has been spilled in re-cent years on the ethics and
standards that should be applied to
third party neutrals acting as media-
tors, arbitrators or evaluators in a
variety of "alternative" (or as we now
say, "appropriate") dispute resolution
fora.' Much less ink has been spilled
on what could be an even more
difficult issue: Should different ethical
standards be applied to lawyers who
serve as "representatives" inside ADR
processes than the usual rules applied
to lawyers in their roles as "advocates"
or "counselors" in the more traditional
adversary system?
At the threshold level it is
important to consider what asking this
question means. Can/should lawyers
be mandated by ethical standards or
rules (or other legal measures, such as
liability rules) to "behave" differently
in ADR than in "ordinary" representa-
tion?
For those of us who want to
change lawyers' behavior in mediation
to include more creative, synergistic,
problem-solving, integrative and can-
did negotiating activities,2 is a change
of "ethics" rules the best (or only) way
to accomplish such cultural change, or
should behavioral change be left to
other, more effective means, such as
education, different incentive struc-
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tures' (such as reverse contingent or
"bonus" fees based on settlements or
court-mandated ADR programs), or
changing client preferences (such as
the use of ADR programs as the
expression of "Total Quality Manage-
ment" within some corporate and
organizational client settings)'?
For some, there is an even more
controversial and prior question:
Should the goals of representation
within ADR be any different than
those in the more traditional adversarial
i
setting'? Doesn't a client (and her
lawyer) have the "right" to maximize
her interests within a mediation, an
arbitration and an early neutral
evaluation'? In the many recent efforts,
in new books, articles and training
programs, to train lawyers to be
"mediation advocates,"' (a term I have
found as oxymoronic as others find
"evaluative mediation"), the assump-
tion seems to be that mediation is just
another form of adversarial hearing
that needs to be planned and prepared
for, perhaps with just a few nodifica-
tions, including client-role preparation
and divisions of labor between lawyer
and clients for presenting the case,
making arguments, addressing the




It is sad to say that my prediction
of almost 10 years ago, that ADR
processes would be "co-opted" by
traditional adversarial processes, rather
than become differently organized and
motivated problem-solving processes,
has come true.' In recent years I have
watched lawyers write letters "filing
an ADR proceeding against" another
party and threatening to "change their
mediation strategy" if a particular
demand or proposal is not adhered to.
Clearly, the language of tradi-
tional adversarial practice has taken
over or conquered many processes that
were supposed to be based on different
foundational principles of seeking
joint gain, attempting to find Pareto
optimal solutions, causing less harm to
the parties and exploring solutions to
underlying problems that were not
exclusively legally based, but consid-
ered more of the parties' underlying
economic, business, social, psycho-
logical, moral or political needs and
interests.6
As a result, even mediation -
which was supposed to have been the
most "alternative" to traditional adver-
sary practice, and thus differs from the
more conventional and adversarial
"ethics" of arbitration, for example 
-
can now be called "adversarial"
mediation, at least in some contexts,
where lawyers on "opposite" sides
clearly prepare briefs or "mediation
submissions," plan opening statements
and case narratives, ask for third party
neutral evaluations and direct their
attention to the mediator, when they
should be planning, with their clients,
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how to negotiate and problem-solve
with "the other side." Mediation, is
after all, still considered to be
facilitated negotiation, seeking agree-
ment and settlement and not a
"decision-seeking" process.
As I have argued in the third party
neutral context, not all ADR is alike
and we may have to take account of the
different foundational principles, or-
ganization or "logics" of different
processes to consider what ethics are
appropriate in each. Thus, while it
might make sense to talk about
"arbitration advocacy" (and traditional
adversarial ethics therein, with little
modification of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct), I prefer to talk
about "representation" in mediation,
not mediation advocacy, to at least
attempt a semantic distinction between
the role of the lawyer in a decision-
seeking (adjudicative) environment
from a settlement seeking (problem-
solving or negotiation) process in
which a lawyer may still "represent" a
client, but with different purposes, and
presumably with a different audience
(the "other side(s)" and its lawyers, not
the mediator) in mind.
The Basic Ethical Duties
So, the question is what obliga-
tions do lawyer-representatives in
negotiation have and do these obliga-
tions or ethical requirements change
with the presence of a third party
mediator?
At the most minimal level,
lawyers may not knowingly make a
material misrepresentation of a mate-
rial fact or law (Model Rule 4.1) (with
exceptions for "puffing" and other
conventional negotiation activities
stated above), they may not fail to
disclose a material fact when disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client
(Rule 4. 1(b) (unless disclosure would
otherwise be protected by the confi-
dentiality requirements of Rule 1.6),
and they may not communicate with a
party known to be represented by a
lawyer (Rule 4.2).
Lawyers also must maintain client
confidences, unless the client autho-
rizes them to reveal information (Rule
1.6), which has implications for what
lawyers may disclose to mediators, as
well as to third parties, potentially
involving either "double" confidenti-
ality or privilege issues or conflicting
confidentiality duties in mediation and
in client representation.
Lawyers must also inform clients
about the status of a matter so that a
client may make informed decisions
about the case (Rule 1.4) and a lawyer
must abide by a client's decision as to
whether to settle a matter (Rule 1.2, a
rule which has been interpreted to
mean that a lawyer must transmit all
settlement offers to the client).
How the lawyer behaves in
negotiation and in mediation, beyond
these "minimal" ethical requirements
remains subject only to the lawyer's
sense of what is appropriate "represen-
tation" or advocacy, what a client
might expect (based on the client's
familiarity with or philosophy about
ADR processes), any independent
substantive or process rules (such as
discovery or disclosure requirements
in court annexed programs) and
whatever contractual or process ar-
rangements are agreed upon by the
parties in an ADR proceeding.
This means some forms of
mediation or ADR might impose
"higher" standards of disclosure or
conduct by contract (agreement of the
parties, process rules of the third party
neutral) or court rules (some courts and
states have attempted, by statute or
court rule, to regulate conduct and
behavior such as mandated disclosures
or requirements for "good faith"
participationx).
There remain some tricky ambi-
guities in the application of the
traditional rules of ethics to ADR.
Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer to
disclose "to a tribunal" legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be "directly adverse to
the position of the client." Is a court-
sponsored mediation such a "tribu-
nal?" Is an early neutral evaluation
session conducted under a court
program's requirements, but held in a
private law office, such a tribunal?
Similarly, if the purpose of this
rule is to protect a court from making
an incorrect legal decision (with
potential adverse precedential effects)
should it make a difference whether
the ADR proceeding is an arbitration
(where a decision will be rendered,
but not published) or a mediation
(where the mediator has no authority
to render a "decision" on the law)?
Should there be disclosure of such
adverse authority if the ADR process
is an "early neutral evaluation,"which
is intended to take account of the
substantive law? Or an evaluative
mediation, in which the parties will ask
the mediator to opine on legal merits,
as well as facts, or other party
interests?
Accountability in ADR
Is there an argument that there
should be greater candor (both with
respect to law and fact) in mediation
sessions where there will be no court
scrutiny of the settlement (like the
argument for greater candor in
negotiation above), but will be
"presided" over by a third party neutral
who may care about or feel some
responsibility for the agreement that is
reached?" Or, is mediation just like a
negotiation, in which the parties must
accept whatever advocacy resources
they have, knowing these may affect
the outcome'? Does it make a
difference whether the ADR takes
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place privately or in a court-sanctioned
setting? Or if one of the parties is not
represented?
Recently, the ethical requirements
with respect to client counseling have
been expanded in some states by court
rulings, ethics rule changes or ethics
committee opinions to require counsel
to advise clients about the possibilities
of ADR and various methods of
settlement that might be considered
more appropriate than litigation in
some cases.' Requests by one side to
consider the use of ADR must, in such
cases, be communicated to one's client
just like a specific settlement offer
under Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4. If such
rulings are adopted more widely (and
enforced) they may do more to
increase the use of ADR than all prior
efforts. It may no longer be a sign of
"weakness" to suggest ADR and a
lawyer may not unilaterally decide to
avoid other methods of dispute
resolution than the one he or she is
most familiar with.
With the expanding nature of
roles to be played by counsel in
resolving disputes, there is also greater
complexity with respect to the ethics
and rules of conflicts of interest. Can a
lawyer who represents one party
against another in a mediation that
settles then represent another party
against the former opponent when the
lawyer has learned confidential infor-
mation about the opponent in media-
tion?" Can a lawyer who serves as a
mediator between two parties subse-
quently represent one of those parties
in a later matter, whether related or
unrelated?' 2 Can a lawyer who
represents a client ever mediate a
matter involving that client and
another?'"
Similarly, are these conflicts
issues different when a single counsel
"switches" roles from representative to
arbitrator or vice versa? If a single
lawyer cannot switch roles without a
conflict of interest, when must the
whole firm be disqualified, or will a
conflicts "screen" sufficiently shield
the involved lawyer to allow continued
representation by other firm mem-
bers? 4
Even without role switching there
may be complex conflicts of interest
rules inherent in the use of ADR. What
if, during a mediation, counsel agrees
to a confidentiality provision (which
might even include a protective order)
and learns a critical fact from the
defendant? If the mediation fails, is
counsel able to effectively represent
her client without using this fact, as
promised?"
A Problem of Zeal
Most of the ethical dilemmas that
remain to be revealed, if not resolved,
in the use of ADR within a framework
of adversarial advocacy might be
"reduced" to the question of when can/
should a lawyer-representative turn off
the "zeal" to be an effective problem-
solver?
In my ideal world, ethics rules
might require lawyers to be creative,"
looking for solutions that maximize
client gain while causing the least
harm to others - or, even more ideally,
that maximize gain (or minimize
harm) to all those involved in a legal
problem, 7 to be candid with their
clients, mediators, arbitrators, judges
and opponents, and to refuse to insist
on an agreement or outcome that
causes injustice or is worse than one
the parties could achieve in some other
way (such as litigation).
On the other hand, this is not my
ideal world and I am not so naive as a
legal ethicist to think that we can
change behavior by changing a few
ethics rules. (Is legal behavior now
anywhere close to what the rules
provide?) Yet, I also know, as an ADR
practitioner, as well as an ethicist, that
the clash of values represented in what
our basically adversarial code of zeal
requires from what good problem-
solving recommends will inevitably
lead us into conflicts of ethics.
In a recent mediation I partici-
pated in, counsel prepared excellent
interest-based submissions on the
underlying problem to be solved (not
briefs on the narrow legal issue) and
participated in good faith in face to
face mediations, but when they
returned to their "adversarial dens"
(their law firms), the next round of
written submissions virtually de-
stroyed whatever progress we had
nade by issuing written adversarial
and positional darts into the tentative
and very broad-based proposals for
consideration. Here the adversarial
analysis got in the way of the solution-
seeking synthesis; overly critical
judgments appeared too early in the
"brainstorming" process.
Ultimately. good ADR behavior
may be learned, from educational
programs, from modeling and de-
scriptions of success and from the
recognition that a different kind of
"strategy" may be necessary in
different forms of ADR, depending on
such factors as the parties involved, the
issues and the nature of the dispute or
problem at hand. In the example above,
counsel might have thought more
about the differences between the
written and oral word in ADR, as they
must in more traditional forms of
advocacy."
Like Ms. Manners (my version), I
would prefer that lawyers behaved
"better," or at least differently in
solution-seeking processes. Advocacy
has its place, but the rules that work for
the criminal defense lawyer may not
work for the class action or in-house
organizational lawyer, and will not
work for the lawyer-representative in
some forms of ADR. We are in the
midst of significant cultural changes in
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the law and its practice. Some of these
changes will eventually have to be
reflected, I believe, in ethics codes that
are more sensitive to context and
different venues of practice.
It may, however, be too early to
regulate by ethics codes, except at the
obvious margins of clashes in profes-
sional expectations (confidentiality
and information disclosure; conflicts)
or where there is enough overlap of
duty between an advocate and a
"representative" in ADR (counseling
about client objectives). We may have
to leave the rest to contract, common
law development and more experience
with the different processes before we
can turn behavioral exhortations into
commandments.
Can/should a mediator require
lawyers to engage in only "integrative"
bargaining, rather than "distributive
bargaining" in his venue? Can/
should a mediator or evaluator require
counsel to be absolutely candid with
him? With other parties? As long as
traditional trial or adversarial practices
remain the "default" position for our
system and the cultural image from
which our ethics rules are derived, our
behaviors will likely turn on our own
individual ethics and commitments to
different forms of dispute resolution.
In my ideal world the "problem-
solvers" will inherit the Earth, but I
think we are more likely to get there by
demonstrating the instrumental, as
well as humanistic, advantages of
doing so than by formally requiring
compliance with an ethical code that
doesn't match our behavioral or
cultural evolution (yet).
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